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Piracy Prosecutions in
National Courts
Maggie Gardner*
Abstract
At least for the time being, the international community must rely on national
courts to prosecute modern-day pirates. The first wave of domestic piracy prosecu-
tions suggests, however, that domestic courts have yet to achieve the necessary con-
sistency and expertise in resolving key questions of international law in these
cases. This article evaluates how courts trying modern-day pirates have addressed
common questions of international law regarding the exercise of universal jurisdic-
tion, the elements of the crime of piracy, and the principle of nullum crimen sine
lege. In doing so, it evaluates five decisions issued in 2010 by courts in Kenya, the
Netherlands, the Seychelles and the United States, and it proposes some clear
answers to these recurrent questions of international law in domestic piracy
prosecutions.
1. Introduction
Much attention has recently been paid, by popular media and serious scholars
alike, to the intriguing problem of how to prosecute modern-day pirates.
Despite the enthusiasm (at least from some quarters) for trying pirates in inter-
national or internationalized courts, however, the prosecution of pirates by na-
tional courts exercising universal jurisdiction remains the most efficient, and
currently the most practical, solution.1
If the burden of prosecution is to fall on domestic courts, it is important that
those courts apply the relevant international law correctly and consistently
This has not been the case so far. Now that the first set of modern-day piracy
prosecutions have concluded, judges in national courts should pause to assess
* Law Clerk for the Hon. Michael H. Simon, US District Court for the District of Oregon; Juris
Doctorate magna cum laude, Harvard Law School. The author wishes to thank the anonymous
donor to the Harvard Law School Human Rights Program for the fellowship that made this art-
icle possible; she dedicates it to the memory of Antonio Cassese, without whose encouragement
it would never have been written. [maggie4gardner@post.harvard.edu]
1 See D. Guilfoyle,'Prosecuting Somali Pirates: A Critical Evaluation of the Options, in this issue
of the Journal.
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how their peers in other jurisdictions have analysed similar legal questions.
Applying lessons learned to future cases will help resolve criticisms that
domestic courts lack the experience and expertise to handle these cases, 2 and
that differences in the domestic application of international law will lead to un-
fairly disparate treatment of piracy defendants. 3
This article aims to further that process of reflection and consolidation by
evaluating five piracy decisions issued in 2010 by courts in Kenya, the
Netherlands, the Seychelles and the United States. In doing so, it attempts to
answer clearly the recurrent questions of international law that arise in
domestic piracy prosecutions regarding the scope of universal jurisdiction
over piracy, the elements and customary status of the international crime of
piracy, and whether that crime is defined with adequate specificity to satisfy
the principle of legality (nullum crimen sine lege).
The article addresses these questions from the perspective of international
law. It does not attempt to dictate how domestic courts should apply interna-
tional law within the context of their national legal systems, a process of in-
corporation that may depend on domestic statutes or implicate fundamental
constitutional principles. Given the margin of appreciation states have in
choosing how to implement international law within their national systems,4
some differences in the domestic application of the international law of piracy
will inevitably remain. This article is concerned about minimizing those differ-
ences by ensuring that domestic courts start from a correct understanding of
international law before applying it within the bounds of their legal systems.
Similarly, this article is concerned with piracy solely as an international
crime. As the subsequent discussion will clarify, states may outlaw additional
conduct as 'piracy', but only under their domestic law and subject to their do-
mestic jurisdiction.5 This domestic crime of piracy is often termed 'municipal
piracy' or, more confusingly, 'armed robbery at sea'6 to differentiate it from the
international crime under discussion here. In this article, 'piracy' will refer
solely to the international crime over which domestic courts may exercise uni-
versal jurisdiction.
Before analysing the contours of that international crime, we start with a
brief description of the 2010 piracy decisions.
2 See e.g. M. Arsanjani and WM. Reisman,'East African Piracy and the Defense of World Public
Order', in H. Hestermeyer et al. (eds), Law of the Sea in Dialogue (Springer, 2011) 137-159, at 155.
3 See e.g. J. Goodwin, 'Universal Jurisdiction and the Pirate: Time for an Old Couple to Part', 39
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law (2006) 973, at 1000, 1004-1005; cf. R. Collins and D.
Hassan, Applications and Shortcomings of the Law of the Sea in Combating Piracy', 40 Journal
of Maritime Law & Commerce (2009) 89, at 102-103.
4 See e.g. W Ferdinandusse, Direct Application of International Criminal Law in National Courts
(T.M.C. Asser Press, 2006), at 132.
5 See discussion in Section 3.C, infra.
6 The label is potentially misleading because, as explained below, an intent to rob is not a compo-
nent of the international crime of piracy. See Section 4.A, infra.
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2. The 2010 Piracy Decisions
The five published piracy decisions of 2010 all involved Somali nationals
captured after unsuccessful attacks on ships sailing on the high seas. From
similar factual circumstances, the courts reached different conclusions regard-
ing the elements of the crime of piracy and the ability of the domestic court
to try the defendants. Thus, three sets of defendants were convicted, while the
charges against the other two groups were dismissed.
A. The Netherlands: The 'Cygnus' Case 7
On 2 January 2010, five Somali men in a small skiff attacked the MS
Samanyolu, a ship registered in the Netherlands Antilles and sailing in the
Gulf of Aden. The Danish Navy intervened and seized the defendants. On 15
January 2010, the Dutch authorities agreed to prosecute the suspects for
piracy, but the transfer of custody was not achieved until 10 February 2010.
The next day, the suspects were brought before an investigating magistrate
and assigned a lawyer.
The Rotterdam district court, in a decision issued 17 June 2010, convicted
the five men of piracy. The court noted that Dutch law explicitly establishes
universal jurisdiction over piracy, and it reasoned that international treaties
binding on the Netherlands did not preclude the exercise of such jurisdiction.8
Although the Danish and Dutch authorities were justified in detaining the sus-
pects, and although the court acknowledged the practical difficulties when
naval ships capture suspected pirates on the high seas, it nonetheless held
that the 40-day delay in arraigning the defendants violated Article 5(3) of the
European Convention on Human Rights. It also held, however, that the breach
of this procedural requirement did not prejudice the defendants. After rejecting
additional defence arguments, the court convicted the defendants and sen-
tenced them to five years in prison.
B. The Seychelles: Republic v. Dahir9
On 6 December 2009, eight Somali men were captured after they fired on a
Seychelles Coast Guard patrol vessel, the Topaz, within the Exclusive Economic
Zone of the Seychelles. The Topaz then pursued the 'mother ship' from which
the attack had been launched and arrested three additional men. The 11 sus-
pects were prosecuted in the Seychelles for crimes of terrorism and piracy.
7 Rb. Rotterdam 17 juni 2010, Case No. 10/600012-09, reprinted and trans. in 145 International
Law Reports [ILR] 491. See also Professor Guilfoyle's comment on the case in the same issue.
8 See discussion in Section 3.B, infra.
9 [2010] SCSC 81 (26 July 2010), available online at http://www.saflii.org/sc/cases/SCSC/2010/81.
html (visited 20 June 2012).
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In a decision issued on 26 July 2010, the court dismissed the terrorism charges
but found all the defendants guilty either of piracy (on the basis of joint crim-
inal liability) or of aiding and abetting piracy. Although the Seychelles has
since updated its piracy statute, the law then in force incorporated the
English law of piracy as of 1976, when the Seychelles attained independence.
The court determined that the crime of piracy jure gentium as of 1976 included
attempts to rob or seize a ship, as well as attacks on ships that did not result
in any harm or injury. Thus, it was no defence that the attack on the Topaz
had been quickly repelled: the methods and means of attack nonetheless indi-
cated that the defendants' intent was piratical. The court sentenced all 11
defendants to 10 years in prison.10
C. The United States: United States v. Said" and United States v. Hasan12
The Somali defendants in both Hasan and Said (like those in Dahir) were appre-
hended, on 1 April 2010 and 10 April 2010, respectively, after they allegedly
fired on United States naval ships but before any attempt to board and rob the
targeted ships could have been made. In both cases, the defendants moved to
dismiss the charge of piracy because the indictments only alleged they had
committed acts of violence, not acts of robbery.
The United States piracy statute (18 U.S.C. § 1651) outlaws 'the crime of piracy
as defined by the law of nations,1 3 leaving the United States courts to deter-
mine the elements of the crime of piracy by reference to customary interna-
tional law. In so determining, the Said and Hasan courts reached opposite
conclusions.1 4 In a decision issued on 17 August 2010, the Said court deter-
mined that an act of violence alone could not constitute piracy and dismissed
the count. On 29 October 2010, the Hasan court determined that such conduct
could constitute piracy under section 1651. The defendants were subsequently
convicted by a jury and sentenced by the court to life in prison.1 5 On 23 May
2012, the US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled that the Hasan
court's analysis was correct; it affirmed the convictions and sentences in
Hasan but vacated and remanded the Said decision for further proceedings
consistent with its opinion.16
10 See Republic v. Dahir, [2010] SCSC 86 (26 July 2010), available online at http://www.saflii
.org/sc/cases/SCSC/2010/86.html (visited 20 June 2012).
11 757 E Supp. 2d 554 (E.D. Va. 2010).
12 747 E Supp. 2d 599 (E.D. Va. 2010).
13 18 U.S.C. §1651provides in full that '[w]hoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as
defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found in the United States,
shall be imprisoned for life.
14 See Section 4.B, infra.
15 United States v. Dire, - E3d - , 2012 WL 1860992, at *2 (4th Cir. 2012).
16 See ibid.; United States v. Said, 2012 WL 1868667 (4th Cir. May 23, 2012).
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D. Kenya: In re Hashiz7
On 3 March 2009, nine armed men allegedly attacked the MV Courier in the
Gulf of Aden. They were intercepted by the Germany Navy, with air support
from the US Navy, and transferred to Kenya 10 days later for trial. Kenya,
which had no other jurisdictional nexus to the crime, agreed to prosecute the
alleged pirates through the exercise of universal jurisdiction. The suspects
were tried before a magistrate court under Kenya's piracy statute then in
force, section 69 of the Penal Code, which provided that 'any person who in ter-
ritorial waters or upon the high seas, commits any act of piracy jure gentium
is guilty of the offence of Piracy'.'18 After the close of the prosecution case, the
defendants sought an Order of Prohibition from the High Court to halt the
trial for lack of jurisdiction. The defendants argued that, because the prosecu-
tion had clearly established that the incident took place outside of Kenyan ter-
ritory and that no Kenyan citizens or goods were involved, the magistrate
court lacked jurisdiction to proceed with the case.
The High Court agreed with the defendants in a decision dated 9 November
2010. The court based its ruling primarily on section 5 of Kenya's Penal Code,
which provides that '[t]he jurisdiction of the Courts of Kenya for the purpose
of this Code extends to every place within Kenya, including territorial waters'.
This general grant, the court concluded, prevented the magistrate courts from
exercising jurisdiction over piracy in international waters. As an overarching
provision, section 5 overrode any jurisdictional implications one might draw
from the references to 'piracy jure gentium' and 'the high seas' in section 69 of
the same Code.19 This holding conflicted with the earlier decision of the High
Court in Ahmed v. Republic, which had held that section 69 empowered all but
the lowest magistrate courts of Kenya to exercise universal jurisdiction over
piracy jure gentium.20
During the Hashi trial, section 69 was repealed by the Merchant Shipping
Act of 2009, which incorporated the definition of piracy in Article 101 of the
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). 21 The High Court determined
that the old and new statute covered substantively different crimes; as a
result, the new statute, with its presumably clearer grant of universal jurisdic-
22tion, could not be applied to save the prosecution. The judge therefore
granted the Order of Prohibition and further ordered the immediate release of
the defendants. The Kenyan government appealed the decision, and the Court
17 [2010] eKLR (H.C.K.), available online at http://kenyalaw.org/CaseSearch/viewpreviewl
.php?link=72291501978571352546601 (visited 20 June 2012).
18 See ibid., at 13 (quoting section 69(1) of the Penal Code).
19 See Section 3.A, infra.
20 [2010] eKLR (H.C.K.), available online at http://kenyalaw.org/CaseSearch/view-previewl.
php?link= 54268508962227700682468 (visited 20 June 2012).
21 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 10 December 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3 (hereafter
'UNCLOS').
22 See Merchant Shipping Act of 2009, available online at http://www.kenyalaw.org/Downloads/
Acts/The.MerchantShippingAct.2009.pdf (visited 20 June 2012).
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of Appeals has now recommended that a special bench of five judges be empa-
nelled to resolve the conflicting piracy decisions.23
The different outcomes of these cases reflect in part variations in national
legal systems. But they also reflect some misapprehensions about the content
and application of international law. The following sections further explore
the reasoning of the courts in light of three recurrent themes: jurisdiction,
elements of the offence and due process.
3. Universal Jurisdiction
It is beyond debate that the international crime of piracy is subject to universal
jurisdiction.24 State practice suggests that there are, however, three basic re-
quirements that must be satisfied before domestic courts may exercise univer-
sal jurisdiction: the domestic law must grant the court universal jurisdiction
over piracy, the court must have custody of the defendant and the exercise of
universal jurisdiction must be limited to conduct that falls within the defin-
ition of the international crime of piracy.
A. Domestic Grants ofJurisdiction over the Crime of Piracy
Domestic courts derive their jurisdiction from domestic law.25 Thus, while
international law permits the exercise of universal jurisdiction over piracy, it
is up to states to decide whether or not (and to what extent) its courts may
use that power.26 Given the long-standing and well-established existence of
universal jurisdiction over piracy, courts may presume that lawmakers wrote
domestic piracy statutes with awareness of that jurisdictional right. For this
reason, even if a piracy statute only refers in general terms to 'piracy under
the law of nations' or 'piracy on the high seas', a court might nonetheless dis-
cern a legislative intent to exert universal jurisdiction over piracy to the full
extent permissible under international law.
This appears to have been the argument of the public prosecutor in Hashi.27
Similarly, in another Kenyan piracy case, '[t]he Court took the opinion that
23 M. Mudi,'Kenya: Five-Judge Bench to Handle Piracy Case, Nairobi Star, 21 July 2011.
24 As the US Supreme Court summarized in 1820, there is a'general practice of all nations in pun-
ishing all persons, whether natives or foreigners, who have committed this offence [piracy]
against any persons whatsoever'. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 153, 162 (1820). See also, e.g.
The Case of the S.S. Lotus, 1927 PCIJ Series A, No. 2, at 70 (Moore, J., dissenting); Harvard
Research on International Law, 'Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime', 26 American Journal of
International Law (AJIL), Supplement: Codification of International Law (1932) 435, 563 (here-
after 'Harvard Draft (Jurisdiction)'); A. Cassese et al., International Criminal Law (Oxford
University Press, 2011), 312.
25 See e.g. Lotus, supra note 24, at 68.
26 See e.g. Harvard Research on International Law, 'Piracy, 26 AJIL, Supplement: Codification of
International Law (1932) 743, at 760 (hereafter 'Harvard Draft (Piracy)').
27 See Hashi, [2010] eKLR, at 7-8.
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when Parliament legislated against piracy, it must have been fully aware that
the offence is normally committed in the high seas [and that] the words "jure
gentium" in the municipal description of the offence implied intention to be
bound by international law'.28 This line of reasoning is further bolstered by
the Kenyan Parliament's direction that the High Court and most magistrate
courts may exercise jurisdiction over crimes falling under section 69 of the
Penal Code.29 The High Court in Hashi, however, rejected this argument, con-
cluding instead that the general grant of jurisdiction under section 5 of the
Kenyan Penal Code, which provides Kenyan courts with territorial jurisdiction
only, prevented the magistrate courts from exercising jurisdiction over piracy
committed beyond Kenya's territorial waters.30 This question of domestic law
will have to be resolved by Kenya's Court of Appeals, but it appears that the
High Court in Hashi undervalued the international legal context within
which Kenya's Parliament originally adopted section 69.31
B. Custody of the Defendant and the Question of the'Seizing State'
Perhaps underlying the Hashi court's cautious approach to jurisdiction was a
concern that Kenya lacked any nexus to the crime, including that of the cap-
ture of the pirates. Some scholars have questioned whether a third state with-
out any traditional nexus to the piratical conduct may prosecute suspected
pirates if it did not itself seize them.32 Although no published judicial decision
has yet addressed this issue at length, it is of great practical import as most of
the Somali defendants on trial for piracy in Kenya were captured on the high
seas by other states.33
28 0. Ambani,'Prosecuting Piracy in the Horn of Africa: The Case of Kenya', in C. Murungu and J.
Biegon (eds), Prosecuting International Crimes in Africa (Pretoria University Law Press, 2011)
233-246, at 242-243 (describing Republic v. Kheyre, Case No. 791 of 2009).
29 Section 4 of Kenya's Criminal Procedure Code provides that 'an offence under the Penal Code
may be tried by the High Court, or by a subordinate court by which the offence is shown
in ... the First Schedule to this Code to be triable'. The First Schedule to the Code specifies that
crimes under section 69 may be tried by most magistrates. See Criminal Procedure Code
(2009), available online at http://www.kenyalaw.org/Downloads/GreyBook/9.%2OThe%
20Criminal%2OProcedure%20Code.Ypdf (visited 20 June 2012).
30 Hashi, [2010] eKLR, at 17-18.
31 For further discussion, see J. Gathii,'Jurisdiction to Prosecute Non-National Pirates Captured by
Third States under Kenyan and International Law, 31 Loyola of Los Angeles International and
Comparative Law Review (2009) 363, at 367-368,372-374 (arguing that section 69 implicitly ex-
tends jurisdiction to extraterritorial acts of piracy).
32 See e.g. Ambani, supra note 28, at 238, 243; Arsanjani and Reisman, supra note 2, at 155; Gathii,
supra note 31, at 364, 378-379, 385-386; E. Kontorovich, 'United States v. Shi, 103 AJIL (2009)
734, at 739; J. Isanga, 'Countering Persistent Contemporary Sea Piracy: Expanding
Jurisdictional Regimes, 59 American University Law Review (2010) 1267, at 1279.
33 As of April 2011, Kenya had undertaken 15 prosecutions of piracy involving 130 defendants
captured off the coast of Somalia by other countries. See Filing of Annexes of Materials to the
Application of the Government of Kenya pursuant to Article 19 of the Rome Statute, Muthaura
et al. (ICC-01/09-02/11), 21 April 2011, annex 15.
803
804 JICJ 10 (2012), 797-821
The confusion stems from the text of Article 105 of UNCLOS. While Article
101 of UNCLOS authoritatively defines piracy under international law,34 the
other piracy-related provisions of UNCLOS do not clearly establish the scope
of universal jurisdiction over that crime. Instead, Article 100 broadly states
that '[a]ll States shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression
of piracy on the high seas or any other place outside the jurisdiction of any
State'. Article 105 further provides:
On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State may
seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken by piracy and under the control of
pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on board. The courts of the State
which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also deter-
mine the action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to the
rights of third parties acting in good faith.35
Although Article 105 does introduce some ambiguity, it primarily serves to de-
limit the scope of enforcement jurisdiction, or the right of a state to visit and
search any ship on the high seas suspected of piracy.36 For several reasons, it
should not be read as precluding the exercise of universal judicial jurisdiction
by states other than the capturing state, at least as long as the prosecuting
state has physical custody of the defendants.37
First, Article 105 cannot be read as granting exclusive jurisdiction to the seiz-
ing state. To do so would ignore the rights of states with nationality, passive
personality, or flag-state jurisdiction over the pirate attack, as well as the juris-
dictional provisions of other treaties, like the Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention),38
that may apply to the same conduct. Similarly, there is no reason to presume
Article 105 excludes the exercise of universal jurisdiction allowed under
pre-existing customary international law.
34 See e.g. Arsanjani and Reisman, supra note 2, at 142; R. Jennings and A. Watts (eds), Oppenheim's
International Law, Vol. 1 (9th edn., Oxford University Press, 1999), at 747 (hereafter
'Oppenheim'); M. Paparinskis, 'Piracy, in A. Cassese et al. (eds), The Oxford Companion to
International Criminal Justice (Oxford University Press. 2009) 455, 455. The customary status of
the Art. 101 definition is discussed in Section 4.1, infra.
35 UNCLOS, supra note 21, Art. 105 (emphasis added).
36 On the distinction between executive and judicial jurisdiction in the context of Art. 105, see A.
Cassese,'When May Senior State Officials Be Tried for International Crimes? Some Comments
on the Congo v. Belgium Case, 13 European Journal of International Law (EJIL) (2002) 853-875,
at 858.
37 The argument that Art. 105 does not restrict the traditional scope of universal jurisdiction over
piracy has been most thoroughly articulated in J.A. Roach, 'Countering Piracy off Somalia:
International Law and International Institutions, 104 AJIL (2010) 397, at 404-405. See also D.
Guilfoyle,'The Legal Challenges in Fighting Piracy, in B. van Ginkel and E-P van der Putten
(eds), The International Response to Somali Piracy: Challenges and Opportunities (Martinus
Nijhoff, 2010) 127-152, at 129-130; T. Treves, 'Piracy, Law of the Sea, and Use of Force:
Developments off the Coast of Somalia', 20 EJIL (2009) 399, at 402.
38 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 10
March 1988, entered into force 1 March 1992. The Convention had 158 states parties as of 29
February 2012.
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Second, the permissive language of Article 105 (that the 'courts of the State
which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed')
suggests that provision does not displace other grounds for exercising jurisdic-
tion, but only provides the capturing state with a clear right to exercise juris-
diction if it so chooses. The use of the permissive 'may' in Article 105
contrasts with the overarching directive of Article 100 that '[a]ll States shall
cooperate' to repress piracy - a directive that would also be undermined if
Article 105 were read as restricting the exercise of universal jurisdiction to
just the seizing state.39
Third, the 'drafting history' of Article 105 does not reflect an intention to
limit universal jurisdiction over piracy. Article 105 is derived from Article 15
of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas (High Seas Convention), 0 which in
turn reflected the efforts of the International Law Commission (ILC) to codify
the customary international law of the sea. In its 1956 report to the UN
General Assembly regarding draft articles for the High Seas Convention, the
ILC explained that the text of Article 15 'gives any State the right to seize
pirate ships (and ships seized by pirates) and to have them adjudicated upon
by its courts. This right cannot be exercised at a place under the jurisdiction of an-
other State'.' Some scholars have pointed to this statement as evidence that
the capturing state cannot transfer a suspect to a third state to be prose-
cuted,42 but the comment only references a restriction on where a state can ex-
ercise the described right, not which states may do so. That is, the ILC
comment makes the uncontroversial point that a state has no right to seize a
pirate or to exercise its own adjudicatory powers within the territory of another
state."
In preparing the 1958 High Seas Convention, the ILC relied heavily on a draft
piracy convention compiled by legal scholars in the 1930s under the auspices
of the Harvard research group (the Harvard Draft).44 Drawing from state prac-
tice and scholarly writings, the Harvard Draft concluded that '[a] state which
has lawful custody of a person suspected of piracy may prosecute and punish
that person'.45 Similarly, in the draft convention on jurisdiction under interna-
tional law prepared as part of the same project, the Harvard research group
concluded that states may exercise universal jurisdiction over piracy, with'the
competence to prosecute and punish founded simply upon a lawful custody of
the person charged with the offense'."6 That the relevant jurisdictional fact is
39 See Roach, supra note 37, at 404.
40 Convention on the High Seas. 29 April 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 11 (hereafter 'High Seas Convention').
41 Report of the ILC to the General Assembly UN Doc. A/3159, 1956 UN Yearbook of the ILC 253, 283
(emphasis added) (hereafter 'ILC Report').
42 See e.g. E. Kontorovich, 'International Legal Responses to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia', 13
ASIL Insights (2009) Issue 2; Isanga, supra note 32, at 1275-1276.
43 See D. Guilfoyle, 'Counter-Piracy Law Enforcement and Human Rights', 59 International and
Comparative Law Quarterly (2010) 141, at 145-146.
44 See ILC Report, supra note 41, at 282.
45 Harvard Draft (Piracy), supra note 26, at 745.
46 Harvard Draft (Jurisdiction), supra note 24, at 563-564. The Harvard Drafts continued the work
of the League of Nations' Committee of Experts. Regarding piracy, that Committee suggested
806 JICJ 10 (2012), 797-821
the physical custody of the alleged pirate and not the nationality of the seizing
ship also coincides with Judge Moore's opinion in the Lotus case that 'the
person charged with the offence [of piracy] may be tried and punished by any
nation into whose jurisdiction he may come 47 In sum, universal jurisdiction
over piracy is of the more narrow forum deprehensionis variety that requires
physical custody of the accused48 - but it matters not how that custody was
attained.
Historically and for practical reasons, the state that seized pirates on the
high seas was typically the sole custodial state, as the captain of the seizing
ship would try and execute the captured pirates before returning to land.
There was thus no need to distinguish between the state of seizure and the
state of custody The concept of transferring captured pirates to third states
for prosecution did not receive close attention until the modern era, when tech-
nology combined with heightened concerns for due process made full judicial
proceedings on land both feasible and requisite.50 Thus one purpose of Article
105's language ('[t]he courts of the state which carried out the seizure may
decide upon the penalty to be imposed') may be to clarify that the seizing
state must prosecute the detained persons, if it chooses to do so, in a court of
law.5
The more likely purpose of the Article 105 language, however, is to clarify
that the capturing state has a prerogative to prosecute the suspected pirates,
an interpretation that matches current state practice. 52 It is, for example, the
approach taken by the Djibouti Code of Conduct, an agreement among the
that a ship having seized pirates could bring them'into the port of some country [not necessar-
ily its own] to be judged by a competent tribunal'. League of Nations, Committee of Experts on
the Progressive Codification of International Law 'Piracy, 20 AJIL. Special Supplement (1926)
222-229, at 225 (emphasis added) (hereafter 'League of Nations'). Although the Committee
also proposed that '[j]urisdiction in piracy belongs to the State of the ship making the capture,
ibid., at 229, in context this provision appears to protect the prerogative of the seizing state to
prosecute, with room for other states to assert jurisdiction (including universal jurisdiction) if
the seizing state declines to exercise that prerogative. See e.g. ibid., at 225-226: 'The State
which seizes the pirate vessel and arrests the crew is the obvious judge of the validity of the
capture and the guilt of the parties concerned. It should by preference be accorded the right to
investigate and to pass judgment in the case....' (emphasis added).
47 Lotus, supra note 24, at 70 (emphasis added).
48 See A. Cassese, International Law (2nd edn., Oxford University Press, 2005), at 451-452; see also
Cassese, 'When May Senior State Officials Be Tried for International Crimes?' supra note 36, at
857-858.
49 Harvard Draft (Piracy), supra note 26, at 853-856 (collecting international sources).
50 Cf. ibid., at 853 (rejecting the right of a ship commander to try pirates while at sea as 'old trad-
ition which is inconsistent with the spirit of modern jurisprudence'). The Harvard Draft, while
noting older authorities also allowed for summary execution of pirates, emphasized that such
treatment would be contrary to modern notions of justice, which require 'a formal fair
trial ... however clear the evidence of guilt of piracy may be'. Ibid.
51 See E. Kontorovich, '"A Guantanamo on the Sea" The Difficulty of Prosecuting Pirates and
Terrorists', 98 California Law Review (2010) 243, at 257, 271.
52 See also note 46, supra. Such an approach has the benefit of avoiding positive conflicts of juris-
diction. See Cassese.'When May Senior State Officials Be Tried for International Crimes?' supra
note 36, at 857-858.
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regional states regarding the repression of piracy around the Horn of Africa.5 3
The Code of Conduct employs language very similar to Article 105 in recogniz-
ing the right of the capturing state to prosecute the suspected pirates, but it
then notes that the capturing state may,'in consultation with other interested
entities, waive its primary right to exercise jurisdiction and authorize any
other Participant to enforce its laws against the ship and/or persons on
board'.5 4 In its Code of Practice for the Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and
Armed Robbery against Ships, the International Maritime Organization (IMO)
has further encouraged states to take the necessary steps 'to be able to
receive, prosecute or extradite any pirates ... arrested by warships or military
aircraft' - in other words, to prosecute suspected pirates regardless of which
state has captured them.55 Of course, the right to exercise universal jurisdic-
tion is separate from the legal process of transferring custody between states,
an issue that has led to transfer agreements between states patrolling the Gulf
of Aden, such as the United States and the UK, and coastal states willing to
prosecute pirates, like Kenya and the Seychelles.5 6 These transfer agreements
nonetheless reflect an assumption that the receiving state has the legal right
to exercise universal jurisdiction over pirates in its custody whom it did not
itself capture.5 7
It must be anticipated that some suspects transferred in this manner to
Kenya or other third states will raise Article 105 as a defence. The reasoning
of the Rotterdam court in The 'Cygnus' Case provides a useful model for analyz-
ing such arguments.5 8 That court first determined that the Dutch Criminal
Code explicitly grants universal jurisdiction over the crime of piracy and then
considered whether this domestic grant conflicts with UNCLOS or the SUA
Convention. It acknowledged the 'seizing state' language of Article 105 of
UNCLOS but concluded that the language did not, either explicitly or implicitly,
vest exclusive jurisdiction in the seizing state (Denmark) so as to preclude the
exercise of universal jurisdiction by another country (the Netherlands). While
the court acknowledged that the Netherlands had a traditional interest in the
prosecution because the victim ship was registered in the Netherlands
Antilles, it took care to emphasize that such considerations were relevant
only to the question of the expediency of exercising jurisdiction, not to the
fact of jurisdiction itself.
53 Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in the
Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden, 29 January 2009, annexed to IMO Doc. C 102/4
(hereafter 'Djibouti Code of Conduct').
54 Ibid., at Art. 4(6)-4(7) (emphasis added).
55 International Maritime Organization (IMO), Res. A.1025(26), 18 January 2010, Annex (Code of
Practice for the Investigation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships), § 3.1 (hereafter
'IMO Code of Practice').
56 See e.g. Guilfoyle, 'Prosecuting Somali Pirates', supra note 1, at 773; Guilfoyle, 'The Legal
Challenges in Fighting Piracy', supra note 37, at 130.
57 See Kontorovich, "A Guantanamo on the Sea", supra note 51, at 271.
58 See 145 ILR 491.
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Generalizing from the approach of The 'Cygnus' Case, a court might analyse a
defence based on Article 105 by first identifying the scope of jurisdiction
under domestic law (which, it has been argued here, should be interpreted in
light of the legislature's presumed awareness of universal jurisdiction over
piracy jure gentium). If the court has jurisdiction as a matter of national law, it
might then note that Article 105 does not preclude prosecution by a state
other than the capturing state, while customary international law affirma-
tively allows for it. Finally, the court might evaluate whether other factors, par-
ticularly requests by other states to prosecute the defendants, nonetheless
bear on the choice to exercise jurisdiction in a particular case.
C. Limits of Universal Jurisdiction
There are, however, important limits to the exercise of universal jurisdiction
over piracy.
As the US court in Hasan correctly emphasized,'a state's ability to invoke uni-
versal jurisdiction is inextricably intertwined with, and thus limited by, the
substantive elements of the crime as defined by the consensus of the interna-
tional community'.59 That is, a domestic court may only exercise universal jur-
isdiction over conduct falling within the crime of piracy as defined by
international law.6 0 Indeed, the very point of defining the crime of piracy
under international law is, in many respects, to define and therefore circum-
scribe the extent to which states may exercise universal jurisdiction over the
citizens and ships of other countries.6 ' It must be remembered that, in the con-
text of piracy, the reach of universal judicial jurisdiction goes hand-in-hand
with the right to exercise universal enforcement jurisdiction - a power of
much greater concern to flag states and which has been carefully restricted
under both customary and treaty law.62
Thus courts must be careful to distinguish clearly between the crime of
piracy proper and that of 'municipal piracy', over which universal jurisdiction
does not extend. We turn, then, to consider the content of the crime of piracy
under customary international law.
59 747 E Supp. 2d at 608.
60 See e.g. Lotus, supra note 24, at 70; Harvard Draft (Jurisdiction), supra note 24, at 566; E
Campbell, A Modern History of the International Legal Definition of Piracy', in B.A. Elleman,
A. Forbes and D. Rosenberg (eds), Piracy and Maritime Crime: Historical and Modern Case
Studies (Naval War College Press, 2010) 19-32, at 21; I. Shearer, 'Piracy, in Max Planck
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (updated October 2010), at § 4.
61 See Harvard Draft (Piracy), supra note 26, at 757, 782.
62 See e.g. Lotus, supra note 24, at 71; R. Wolfrum, 'Fighting Terrorism at Sea: Options and
Limitations under International Law, in M. Nordquist et al., Legal Challenges in Maritime
Security (Nijhoff, 2008) 3-40, at 27. Indeed, Art. 105 of UNCLOS is primarily addressed to cir-
cumscribing this enforcement right, with the subsequent two articles limiting which ships
are entitled to exercise the right of enforcement (only 'warships or military aircraft') and estab-
lishing liability when the right is exercised without adequate grounds. See UNCLOS, supra
note 21, Arts 106-107.
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4. The International Crime of Piracy
From the perspective of international law, the crime of piracy is authoritatively
defined by Article 101 of UNCLOS:
Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
a. any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private
ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on
board such ship or aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of
any State.
b. any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with know-
ledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
c. any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a)
or (b).
This Part clarifies the elements of this definition before building the case that
Article 101 represents customary international law. It concludes with a brief
consideration of the problem of intertemporal law when states incorporate cus-
tomary international law into domestic law by general reference.
A. Elements of the Crime of Piracy
The crime prohibited by Article 101(a) consists of five elements:
(1) any illegal act of violence or detention, or any act of depredation;
(2) committed for private ends;
(3) on the high seas or a place outside the jurisdiction of any state;
(4) by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft; and
(5) (if at sea) directed against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or
property on board such ship or aircraft.
The first element makes clear that piracy is not co-extensive with 'armed
robbery at sea': what is required is either 'illegal acts of violence or detention'
or 'any act of depredation'. Even before the codification of Article 101, the cus-
tomary international law of piracy no longer required an intent to rob (animus
furandi).63 But if there is an intent to rob, it may be that no violence is neces-
sary for the conduct to be considered piratical.64
63 See e.g. ILC Report, supra note 41, at 282 (Acts of piracy may be prompted by feelings of hatred
or revenge, and not merely by the desire for gain.'); League of Nations, supra note 46, at 224,
228; Harvard Draft (Piracy), supra note 26, at 786-787: Oppenheim, supra note 34, at 752.
64 This at least was the conclusion of the Harvard Draft. Harvard Draft (Piracy), supra note 26, at
786.'Depredation'as a legal term, however, arguably connotes violent conduct (plunder, pillage).
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The third element, that piracy jure gentium must occur outside the sovereign
territory of any state, is a critical component of the definition as it excludes ter-
ritorial waters from the reach of universal jurisdiction.6 5 Under UNCLOS, terri-
torial waters extend up to 12 nautical miles from the state's shoreline.66 While
UNCLOS also allows states to claim limited sovereign interests in an additional
200-nautical mile stretch of water, this 'exclusive economic zone' (EEZ) counts
as international waters for the purposes of Article 101.67 Thus, for example,
the Seychelles court in Dahir correctly concluded that individuals could be
guilty of piracy proper (rather than municipal piracy) for conduct that
occurred within the country's EEZ.68
The second, fourth and fifth elements have together elicited the most debate.
By their terms, they exclude from the definition of piracy mutinies, hijackings
and official state acts. Such acts may nonetheless give rise to the state responsi-
bility6 9 or be governed by treaties like the SUA Convention and its many
Protocols,70 established specifically to reach violent conduct like terrorist
hijackings that may not otherwise fall under the customary definition of
piracy.71 But what about a private ship attacking another ship on the high
seas (thus meeting elements four and five), where the aggressors' motivation is
political - that is, can a terrorist attack in international waters also constitute
piracy under Article 101?
65 Some commentators have argued that the crime of piracy should extend to territorial waters,
specifically to address the inability of failed states to police their own waters. See e.g. M.
Madden, 'Trading the Shield of Sovereignty for the Scales of Justice: A Proposal for Reform of
International Sea Piracy Laws', 21 University of San Francisco Maritime Law Journal (2008) 139,
145-146; B. Dubner, 'On the Definition of the Crime of Sea Piracy Revisited: Customary vs.
Treaty Law and the Jurisdictional Implications Thereof', 42 Journal of Maritime Law and
Commerce (2011) 71; see also Collins and Hassan, supra note 3, at 97-98. Such an approach con-
flicts, however, with the rationale for universal jurisdiction as based (at least in part) on the
lack of any state's territorial jurisdiction over piracy. It is also unnecessary: in cases like that
of Somalia, ad hoc solutions are both possible and preferable, as the Harvard research group
recognized in the 1930s. See Harvard Draft (Piracy), supra note 26, at 789-790: 'In some parts
of the world where it is peculiarly difficult to suppress violence and depredations against com-
merce in territorial waters, special agreements providing for concurrent police jurisdiction
may be needed.... These special cases, of course, cannot be covered by a draft convention de-
signed for general adoption' States also continue to reject such an expansion of universal juris-
diction; in permitting the limited pursuit of pirates within Somalia's territorial waters, the
Security Council emphasized that this authorization has a narrow temporal and geographic
scope and affirmatively does not establish customary international law. See e.g. SC Res. 1816
(2008), §§ 7, 9; SC Res. 1846 (2008), §§ 10-11; SC Res. 1851 (2008), §§ 6, 10; see also Guilfoyle,
'Counter-Piracy Law Enforcement and Human Rights', supra note 43, at 148.
66 UNCLOS, supra note 21, Art. 3.
67 Ibid., at Arts 57 and 58(2).
68 See Dahir, [2010] SCSC 81 at § 57.
69 Paparinskis, supra note 34, at 456; Oppenheim, supra note 34, at 748.
70 Regarding the possible application of other conventions in the efforts to repress Somali piracy,
see Roach, supra note 37, at 406-408.
71 See H. Tuerk,'Combating Terrorism at Sea: The Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety
of Maritime Navigation, in Nordquist, supra note 62, 41-78, at 47-48 (describing the develop-
ment of the SUA Convention after the Achille Lauro hijacking in 1985).
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The Seychelles court in Dahir rejected the conflation of these criminal cate-
gories, reasoning that the requirement that piracy be committed for 'private
ends' conflicts with the politically motivated nature of terrorism.72 The court
chastised the prosecution for pursuing piracy and terrorism charges for the
same criminal conduct instead of charging them in the alternative.73 The
Dahir court was wise to distinguish clearly between terrorism and piracy, two
labels that are used loosely in common rhetoric but which should be restricted
in a criminal context to their more precise legal definitions.74 Just as '[n]ot
every use or firing of [rifles] is taken as terrorism7, 5 not every act of violence
on the high seas is piracy
It is true that terrorism under international law requires an intent to coerce
a government authority or to terrorize a population, which typically implies a
political or ideological motivation.7 7 While many assume (like the Dahir
court) that the 'private ends' requirement therefore excludes all terrorist acts
from the ambit of piracy,78 this conclusion might be too hasty.79 The commen-
tary to the Harvard Draft suggests the 'private ends' requirement was originally
intended to exclude from the definition of piracy only the acts of belligerents
and rebels who do not have the standing of states under international law, but
who nonetheless operate within the context of the laws of war or of state re-
sponsibility and whose acts might therefore be considered 'public'. 0 Under
this perspective, the opposite of 'private' would not be 'political' but 'public'.
Terrorists might act with a proclaimed political motivation, but they are not
typically public actors in this sense. This was the reasoning of the Belgian
Court of Cassation in Castle John v. NV Mabeco, which found that members of
the environmental group Greenpeace engaged in piracy when they boarded,
72 Although the Dahir court did not apply Art. 101, but rather customary international law as of
1976, these are equivalent. See Section 4.B, infra.
73 Dahir, [2010] SCSC 81 at §§ 37,47.
74 See e.g. H. Tuerk,'The Resurgence of Piracy: A Phenomenon of Modern Times', 17 University of
Miami International and Comparative Law Review (2009) 1, at 26-27, 32.
75 Dahir, [2010] SCSC 81 at § 43.
76 See e.g. T. Mensah, 'Piracy at Sea - a New Approach to an Old Menace, in Hestermeyer et al.
(eds), supra note 2, 161-177, at 163; Wolfrum, supra note 62, at 4, 8.
77 See e.g. Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide,
Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, In re Hariri (STL-11-01/I), Appeals Chamber, 16 February
2011, § 106 (collecting sources).
78 E.g. I. Bantekas and S. Nash, International Criminal Law (3rd edn., Routledge Cavendish. 2007),
at 179; Collins and Hassan, supra note 3, at 98-100; IMO Secretariat, Uniform and Consistent
Application of the Provisions of International Conventions Relating to Piracy IMO Doc. LEG 98/8,
18 February 2011, §§ 14-16.
79 See Ambani, supra note 28, at 237; M. Bahar, Attaining Optimal Deterrence at Sea: A Legal and
Strategic Theory for Naval Anti-Piracy Operations, 40 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
(2007) 1, 26-37; Guilfoyle, 'Counter-Piracy Law Enforcement and Human Rights', supra note
43, at 143; M. Halberstam,'Terrorism on the High Seas: The Achille Lauro, Piracy and the IMO
Convention on Maritime Safety, 82 AJIL (1988) 269, 277-284.
80 See Halberstam, ibid., at 277-284; see also Harvard Draft (Piracy), supra note 26, at 786, 798;
League of Nations, supra note 46, at 224. But see Tuerk, 'Combating Terrorism at Sea' supra
note 71, at 47-48; Wolfrum, supra note 62, at 8.
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occupied and caused damage to other vessels on the high seas that were dis-
charging polluting waste.8 1 The defendants' motivation, according to the
court, was a personal point of view, even though it related to a political issue;
because the acts were not committed in the interest or to the detriment of a
state, they were properly characterized as 'private'.82
This understanding of 'private ends' as the inverse of 'public ends'
(and not 'political ends') would prevent perpetrators from avoiding liability by
constructing political justifications for their piratical conduct.8 3 It would also
allow the exercise of enforcement jurisdiction over pirate ships believed to be
preparing terrorist acts, particularly when the suspected pirate-terrorist ship
is operating, not under the jurisdiction of any flag-state, but in a state of
anarchy.
Still, the anti-terrorism regime has now developed sufficiently that there is
no need to stretch the anti-piracy regime to cover terrorist acts - and there
may be some real costs to doing so.84 When new threats emerge, existing
legal notions may be broadly interpreted to avoid lacunae, but such stop-gap
measures can in the long run have unintended consequences. With the wide
adoption of the SUA Convention (and the development of several Protocols to
cover additional emerging threats), prosecutors and courts have a better-tai-
lored regime for addressing the problem of maritime terrorism. While there is
a legitimate argument that some acts of terrorism could constitute piracy, the
Dahir court was correct in spirit: courts should avoid relying on the law of
piracy to sanction politically motivated violence unless absolutely necessary
- and only if all the other elements of Article 101 have been met.
B. Article 101 as Customary International Law
State practice and opinio juris uniformly make clear that Article 101 of UNCLOS
reflects the current customary international law of piracy. The definition was
adopted almost word-for-word from Article 15 of the High Seas Convention,
itself a codification of existing customary international law.85 Between the
states parties to the High Seas Convention and to UNCLOS, 168 countries have
bound themselves to this definition, including 138 of the 150 countries with
81 77 ILR 537 (1986).
82 Ibid., at 539-540.
83 See e.g. Mensah, supra note 76, at 165.
84 Cf. Collins and Hassan, supra note 3, at 100 ('To expand piracy to include terrorist acts would
undermine the anti piracy regime, since the strategies to combat each crime are poles apart.');
Tuerk,'The Resurgence of Piracy, supra note 74, at 32 (expressing concern about the conflation
of piracy's universal jurisdiction and the SUA Convention's more narrow prosecute-or-extradite
regime).
85 See Oppenheim, supra note 34, at 723-724, 726; V. Lowe, International Law (Oxford University
Press, 2007), at 83.
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maritime borders.86 And of the 162 countries that have ratified or acceded to
UNCLOS, none have made any declaration or reservation regarding the piracy
provisions.87 While the United States, a major maritime country, has not yet
ratified UNCLOS, it has nonetheless consistently affirmed that the Convention's
piracy provisions represent binding customary international law.88 Meanwhile,
the states most affected by modern-day piracy in Southeast Asia and around
the Horn of Africa have adopted additional anti-piracy cooperation agreements
that incorporate the Article 101 definition.89
At the international level, the UN Security Council in unanimous resolutions
has repeatedly reaffirmed that Article 101 'sets out the legal framework applic-
able to combating piracy and armed robbery at sea'.90 The IMO has similarly
invoked Article 101 as the definitive statement of the crime of piracy,91 and
other UN agencies have reiterated the definition's customary status.92 The cus-
tomary status of Article 101 is further supported by major treatises and the
consensus of the scholarly community9 3 While some would extend the defin-
ition to encompass additional acts, there is no significant dispute that Article
101 embodies the core of the crime which all agree should be universally con-
demned.9 Thus, Article 101 sets the minimum extent to which national
courts can apply universal jurisdiction.
Despite this strong evidence that Article 101 represents customary interna-
tional law, two US trial courts - sitting in the same district, considering simi-
lar facts, and ruling within months of each other - nonetheless reached
opposite conclusions as to the clarity and content of the customary law of
piracy. While the analysis employed by the Hasan court demonstrates an accur-
ate understanding of the nature and sources of international law, the analysis
86 The status of ratifications for both the High Seas Convention and UNCLOS are available online
at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ParticipationStatus.aspx (visited 20 June 2012) (see Chapter
XXI: Law of the Sea).
87 See ibid.
88 See'Declaration of Legal Adviser Harold Hongju Koh', United States v. Hasan, Case No. 2:10cr56
(E.D. Va., 3 September 2010), at §§ 10-18 (gathering statements).
89 See Djibouti Code of Conduct, supra note 53, Art. 1; Regional Cooperation Agreement on
Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia, 28 April 2005, reprinted in 44 ILM
(2005) 829, Art. 1.
90 SC Res. 1976, 11 April 2011, preamble; see also, e.g. SC Res. 1950 (2010), preamble; SC Res. 1918
(2010), preamble.
91 IMO Code of Practice, supra note 55, at § 2.1.
92 See UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Piracy: Elements of National
Legislation Pursuant to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, IMO Doc. LEG/
98/8/1, 18 February 2011, at §§ 1, 11; UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Establishment of a
Legislative Framework to Allow for Effective and Efficient Piracy Prosecutions, IMO Doc. LEG/98/8/
2, 18 February 2011, at § 3.
93 See e.g. Bantekas and Nash, supra note 78, at 178; Shearer, supra note 60, at § 27; Treves, supra
note 37, at 401 ('[A]s a matter either of customary or of conventional law, these Articles state
the law as currently in force.); I. Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (7th edn.,
Oxford University Press, 2008), at 229; see also Hasan at 747 F. Supp. 2d at 636 n.32 (collecting
additional sources).
94 See e.g. Dubner, supra note 65, at 91-92; Madden, supra note 65, at 140-141.
813
814 JICJ 10 (2012), 797-821
conducted by the Said court suggests instead a misapprehension of how cus-
tomary international law is formed and from what sources it can most accur-
ately be gleaned.
To identify the customary international law of piracy, the Hasan court cor-
rectly considered 'the works of jurists, writing professedly on public laws;... the
general usage and practice of nations; [and] judicial decisions recognising
and enforcing that law'. 5 Focusing on state practice, the court noted
UNCLOS's wide ratification, including by countries like Somalia most affected
by modern-day piracy, and it acknowledged that a treaty ratified by an 'over-
whelming majority' of states is evidence of customary international law, at
least when states consistently act in conformity with the treaty provisions.96
It also considered significant piracy decisions from the US, British and Kenyan
courts.97 Finally, in collecting scholarly writings, the court correctly clarified
that academic debates over some aspects of the definition of piracy do not
detract from the consensus that Article 101 represents the core of the custom-
ary international law of piracy. Applying the Article 101 definition of piracy,
the Hasan court determined that the alleged acts of violence, regardless of
animusfurandi, could constitute 'piracy' under 18 U.S.C. § 1651.
Unlike the Hasan court, the Said court interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 1651 as limited
to acts of armed robbery on the high seas, based primarily on a US Supreme
Court decision from 1820, United States v. Smith.99 As a result, it dismissed a
piracy charge because the defendants did not board or rob the targeted ship.
The US government had argued, in line with the subsequent decision in the
Hasan case, that an intent to rob is not an element of the modern customary
definition of piracy. The Said court acknowledged that the government's pos-
ition was supported by UNCLOS and the High Seas Convention; by the cele-
brated British case In re Piracy Jure Gentium, which addressed this question in
1934;100 and by commentary in treatises such as Oppenheim's International
Law.101 Nonetheless, the court held that it could not apply the Article 101 defin-
ition of piracy because the clarity of that customary norm was fatally under-
mined by some doubts raised by seven commentators. 102 This conclusion was
flawed.
First, as the Said court itself recognized,os what matters most in the deter-
mination of customary international law is state practice. As described above,
95 Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d at 630 (quoting Smith, 18 U.S. at 160-161).
96 Ibid., at 633-634 (quoting Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 E3d 111, 137 (2d Cir. 2010)).
97 See ibid., at 615-618, 621-622, and 635-636.
98 Ibid., at 636-637.
99 See Said, 757 . Supp. 2d at 559-560.
100 In re Piracy lure Gentium [1934] A.C. 586 (P.C.).
101 Said, 757 E Supp. 2d at 563-564. The court's apparent dismissal of Oppenheim as 'certain pub-
lished treatises by a German law professor'suggests the court may have misapprehended the
nature and import of this particular scholarly source. See ibid., at 563.
102 Ibid., at 564-565.
103 Ibid., at 558.
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that practice overwhelmingly indicates the acceptance and application of
Article 101 as the binding international legal definition of piracy; indeed, this
author is not aware of any contrary declarations by states. Second, even in
terms of state practice, absolute consensus is not required before a norm can
crystallize into customary international law10 4 - much less is it required
among scholars, whose very job is to criticize and spark debate, or to suggest
how that law should develop over time. 05
Third, to the extent courts do rely on scholarly writings as a subsidiary
means for determining the content of international law,106 the writers should
be 'the most highly qualified publicisists of the various nations',107 those 'who
by years of labor, research, and experience, have made themselves peculiarly
well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat'.108 The seven commenta-
tors relied upon by the Said court do not seem collectively to satisfy this stand-
ard. Two of the writers appear to agree that Article 101 of UNCLOS is the
authoritative definition of piracy,109 while another has subsequently explicitly
rejected the Said court's holding.110 Of the remaining four, one was a student,"'
one was a non-academic practitionerll2 and one was quoting a treatise from
1830 in passing while discussing an entirely different topic." 3 The remaining
admittedly significant work relied upon by the court was written more than
20 years ago;" 4 for perspective, during the intervening decades more than
104 See Cassese, International Law, supra note 48, at 157 (discussing the ICJ decisions in the North
Sea Continental Shelf cases and Nicaragua (merits)).
105 Cf. Brownlie, supra note 93, at 24 ('It is ... obvious that subjective factors enter into any assess-
ment of juristic opinion, that individual writers reflect national and other prejudices, and, fur-
ther, that some publicists see themselves to be propagating new and better views rather than
providing a passive appraisal of the law:).
106 See ICJ Statute, Art. 38(1)(d).
107 Ibid.
108 In re The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). The US Supreme Court further clarified that
'[s]uch works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors
concerning what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is'.
Ibid.
109 Judge Tuerk (of ITLOS) posits that UNCLOS 'authoritatively defined' piracy, although more nar-
rowly than pre-existing customary international law. Tuerk, 'The Resurgence of Piracy',
supra note 74, at 10. The Said court cites to Professor Kontorovich's passing comment that
'[t]he crime of piracy consists of nothing more than robbery at sea: E. Kontorovich, 'The
Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction's Hollow Foundation', 45 Harvard International
Law Journal (2004) 183, 191. But Professor Kontorovich has elsewhere explicitly and directly
disagreed with the Said court's proposition, writing instead that '[a] 200-year-old case [mean-
ing Smith] is weak authority for the content of modern customary international law. Today,
the definition of piracy is codified in Article 101 of [UNCLOS].' Kontorovich, 'United States v.
Shi', supra note 32, at 736.
110 Dubner, supra note 65, at 94-95.
111 See Goodwin, supra note 3.
112 See G. Gabel, 'Smoother Seas Ahead: The Draft Guidelines as an International Solution to
Modern-Day Piracy, 81 Tulane Law Review (2007) 1433.
113 See J. Bybee,'Insuring Domestic Tranquility: Lopez, Federalization of Crime, and the Forgotten
Role of the Domestic Violence Clause, 66 George Washington Law Review (1997) 1, at 26 n.166.
114 See A. Rubin, The Law of Piracy (Newport: Naval War College Press, 1988).
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100 additional states have ratified or acceded to UNCLOS.115 Even taken to-
gether, these criticisms of the Article 101 definition do not undermine the
clear scholarly consensus that Article 101 represents customary international
law.116
The Said court also emphasized that the International Maritime Bureau
(IMB), an organ of the International Chamber of Commerce, uses a different
definition from Article 101 when tracking incidents of piracy worldwide.117
But the IMB definition is not intended to have any legally enforceable
import.1 8 The IMB tracks piracy for commercial purposes, to determine the fi-
nancial impact of sea-based violence on the global shipping industry. Its defin-
ition is designed to encompass all violent attacks on ships, including those
that occur in territorial waters (and therefore are not acts of piracy, in the
international sense discussed here). How the IMB defines piracy for a statistical
purpose is irrelevant to the identification of a unitary definition of piracy
under customary international law.
The Said court overlooked the overwhelming consensus as to the customary
status of Article 101 because it focused on sources that do not directly bear on
the formation and content of customary international law. The Hasan court
better applied the process for identifying customary international law, and as
a result it reached the correct conclusion that Article 101 reflects customary
international law, based on state practice (both usus and opinio juris) and rein-
forced by a clear consensus among scholars of international law.119
C. Intertemporality and the Domestic Incorporation of Customary
International Law
Underlying the difference in the analysis conducted by the Hasan and Said
courts may be a more fundamental disagreement: whether a domestic statute
incorporating the law of nations by reference should be interpreted on the
basis of customary international law as it exists today or as it existed at the
time of the statute's adoption.120
115 UNCLOS entered into force in 1994, following the deposit of the sixtieth instrument of ratifica-
tion or accession. See UN Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea,'UNCLOS Overview
and Full Text, http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention-agreements/convention-overviewcon
vention.htm (last updated 21 July 2010). UNCLOS now has 162 state parties.
116 For thorough criticism of Saids reliance on US case law, see T. Helfman, 'Marauders in the
Courts: Why the Federal Courts Have Got the Problem of Maritime Piracy (Partly) Wrong, 62
Syracuse Law Review (2012) 53.
117 Said, 757 E Supp. 2d at 565.
118 See Campbell, supra note 60, at 29.
119 See also Dire, 2012 WL 1860992, at *18 (approving 'the conception of the law outlined' by the
Hasan court).
120 The Said court did not explicitly limit itself to the latter view, but it emphasized that a statute
must be interpreted 'by its ordinary meaning at the time of its enactment' and it suggested
that recognizing the evolution of the customary international law incorporated in the piracy
statute would render that statute unconstitutionally vague, thereby violating due process.
757 F. Supp. 2d at 559, 566. This latter line of argument is taken up below, in Part 5.
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As Professor Cassese has explained, a state legislating on the basis of inter-
national norms has two options: to detail precisely within national legislation
the content of the international norms ('statutory ad hoc incorporation of
international rules'), or to incorporate the international norm by general refer-
ence ('automatic ad hoc incorporation of international law').121 The former
has the benefit of added clarity but the disadvantage of ossifying the law,
requiring further amendment to keep pace with international law over time.
The latter requires those interpreting and applying the statute to take the
extra step of identifying the referenced body of law, but it also allows the na-
tional law to develop in tandem with international law.122
From the perspective of international law, the choice of approach is left to the
individual state, and it will fall to domestic courts to determine which
approach the legislators in fact adopted. Nonetheless, when a statute only ref-
erences an international norm without specifying its content - as the US
piracy statute does - it is logical to impute to the drafters an intention to auto-
matically incorporate international law, including any developments in that
law over time.12 3 Thus it was reasonable for the court in Hasan to conclude
that the US Congress, by outlawing 'the crime of piracy as defined by the law
of nations', adopted a 'flexible - but at all times sufficiently precise - defin-
ition.124 Within the context of the US legal system, this conclusion is supported
by the US Supreme Court decisions suggesting that statutes referencing the
121 Cassese, International Law, supra note 48, at 221.
122 Ibid., at 221-222. The Hasan court used as a cautionary example the expansion of territorial
waters from three to twelve nautical miles. A state whose piracy statute still incorporated
the law of nations as it existed 100 years ago could find itself claiming universal jurisdiction
over piracy occurring within the territorial waters of other states, in clear contradiction to
today's international law and the limits of universal jurisdiction. See Hasan. 747 F. Supp. 2d
at 625. Indeed, statutory ad hoc incorporation can risk introducing rules that contradict
those of international law that may also bind individuals, thereby potentially misleading or
confusing individuals as to what conduct is in fact prohibited. See Ferdinandusse, supra note
4, at 240-241.
123 This was not the approach taken, however, by the Seychelles court in Dahir, which felt bound
by domestic precedent to interpret the piracy statute as incorporating the common law of
piracy as it existed on 29 June 1976, when the Seychelles attained independence. Dahir, at
§ 48. The statute in force at the time of the offence provided that 'any person who is guilty of
piracy or any crime connected with or akin to piracy shall be liable to be tried and punished
according to the law of England for the time being in force'. Prior decisions had definitively in-
terpreted the phrase 'for the time being in force' to refer to the state of the law when the
Seychelles attained its independence. Ibid. Regardless, the Seychelles has subsequently
updated its statute to provide a more detailed definition of piracy in line with Art. 101 of
UNCLOS. Ibid., at § 49.
124 747 F. Supp. 2d at 623; see also Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 11 (1942) (Congress may legislate by
reference to international law without having to 'itself undertake[] to codify that branch of
international law or to mark its precise boundaries, or to enumerate or define by statute all
the acts which that law condemns').
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law of nations should be construed according to contemporary international
law.125
This discussion casts some doubt on the Hashi Court's conclusion that
Kenya's repealed statute, which outlawed 'piracy jure gentium', related to a sub-
stantively different crime from that of the new law, which incorporates Article
101 of UNCLOS.1 26 The court did not clarify its reasoning, which might have
been based on two different premises: that the crime of piracy under current
customary international law differs from the definition found in Article 101,
or that the old piracy statute - despite its general reference to the law of na-
tions - statically incorporated customary law as of the time of its adoption.
As the discussion here illustrates, both of these premises are vulnerable to
challenge.
5. Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and the Requirement
of Adequate Specificity
For states that do incorporate customary international law through general
reference in domestic statutes (automatic ad hoc incorporation), the issue of
intertemporal law leads directly to the principle of legality: how can a law
that flexibly adapts to an external and, in the case of customary international
law, largely unwritten set of laws be adequately specific so as to accord with
modern notions of due process?
The requirement of specificity (nullum crimen sine lege stricta) is a subset of
the overarching principle of legality: the idea that no one should be held crim-
inally responsible for conduct that was not legally prohibited at the time of its
commission (nullum crimen sine lege). From the defendant's perspective, the re-
quirement of specificity ensures fair notice of potential liability, which in turn
protects individuals from arbitrary government behaviour.127 To satisfy this re-
quirement under international law, a criminal prohibition must be foreseeable,
which means it must also be accessible.128
Customary international law - whether codified in treaties or unwritten -
can satisfy the principle of legality.129 Unwritten customary international law
may be difficult for individuals to ascertain; nevertheless, to rise to the level of
customary law, a norm must be so widely accepted and so consistently expressed
125 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 730-732 (2004); see also Hasan, 747 E Supp. 2d at
626-629 (discussing cases). Relying primarily on Sosa, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the
Hasan court that '§ 1651 incorporates a definition of piracy that changes with advancements
in the law of nations'. Dire, 2012 WL 1860992, at *18-19.
126 See Hashi, [2010] eKLR, at 26-27.
127 See Cassese, International Law, supra note 48, at 37-38; Ferdinandusse, supra note 4, at
222-223.
128 See e.g. J. Nilsson, 'The Principle Nullum Crimen Sine Lege, in 0. Olusanya (ed.), Rethinking
International Criminal Law: The Substantive Part (Europa Law Publishing, 2007) 35-64, at 44;
Ferdinandusse, supra note 4. at 237.
129 Ferdinandusse, supra note 4, at 233, 235-236 & n.1390 (collecting authorities).
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that it will perforce be both foreseeable and accessible.130 It must be borne in
mind that 'accessible', in the context of nullum crimen, has a broad meaning
and may require an individual to discern the law by drawing from multiple
sources. Just as an individual may be expected to know how local courts have
previously interpreted and applied domestic criminal prohibitions, so an indi-
vidual can be expected to know the content of customary international law
when it is consistently stated in the declarations of states, judicial decisions
and respected treatises.131
Courts will still need to analyse, under the rubric of their respective legal
systems, whether a principle of unwritten customary international law is ad-
equately foreseeable and accessible in the circumstances. 132 Particularly at
the margins, unwritten customary international law may raise significant
nullum crimen concerns.'33 But the task is made much easier when, as with
piracy, the customary norms have been codified in widely adopted treaties.
Indeed, the definition of piracy has been explicitly and stably codified for
more than 50 years, first in the High Seas Convention and now in UNCLOS.
It thus should not offend the principle of legality for domestic statutes, like
that of the United States, to criminalize piracy by reference to customary inter-
national law without further specifying the elements of the crime. The differ-
ence in approach taken by the US courts in Hasan and Said on this point is
again instructive. The Said court worried that recognizing the evolution of cus-
tomary international norms incorporated within domestic law would render
18 U.S.C. § 1651 unconstitutionally vague, as 'defendants in United States
courts would be required to constantly guess whether their conduct is pro-
scribed' 3 4 The Said court ignored the fact that the definition of piracy is
much more settled today (under Article 101) than it was in 1820, when the US
Supreme Court in Smith resorted to diverse writings on international law to
define piracy under the law of nations.135 Yet even in that situation, the
Supreme Court held that the US piracy statute (what is today 18 U.S.C. § 1651)
'sufficiently and constitutionally defined' the crime of piracy because the
130 See Hasan, 747 E Supp. 2d at 639 ('Importantly, the high hurdle for establishing customary
international law, namely the recognition of a general and consistent practice among the
overwhelming majority of the international community, necessarily imputes to Defendants
fair warning of what conduct is forbidden...!); Ferdinandusse, supra note 4, at 237 (noting
that the practical difficulty of accessing unwritten international law is 'greatly mitigated by
the fundamental character'of many international crimes).
131 See Nilsson, supra note 128, at 47; Ferdinandusse, supra note 4, at 237; see also Hasan, 747 F.
Supp. 2d at 639-640 (citing United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259 (1997)).
132 See Ferdinandusse, supra note 4, at 223-224, 230-231 (noting that most states enforce a stric-
ter version of the principle of legality as a matter of domestic law).
133 See ibid., at 238-241.
134 Said, 757 E Supp. 2d at 566.
135 Smith, 18 U.S. at 163, note h (collecting foreign commentaries on the definition of 'piracy'
under international law).
820 JICJ 10 (2012), 797-821
statute incorporated international law that is generally of 'known and deter-
minate meaning'.
Likewise, the Hasan court correctly concluded that UNCLOS provides a clear
and settled definition of piracy under today's international law that is more
than sufficient to provide fair warning to the defendants.' 37 As the court
noted, 'it is far more likely that the Defendants, who claim to be Somali na-
tionals, would be aware of the piracy provisions contained in UNCLOS, to
which Somalia is a party, than of Smith, a nearly two hundred year-old case
written by a court in another country literally half a world away'.138
Indeed, defendants prosecuted domestically for the international crime of
piracy should have weak arguments that they lacked adequate notice that
their conduct was prohibited.139 Piracy is the oldest international crime, and
the specific conduct that constitutes piracy has been internationally codified
for more than 50 years. The right of states to exercise universal jurisdiction
over that crime has also been firmly established for decades, if not centuries.
Individuals engaging in piratical conduct on the high seas should thus be pre-
pared to be hauled before any court in any jurisdiction - that is the very nub
of the concept of universal jurisdiction.140 At least under the fair trial stand-
ards of international human rights conventions, defence arguments based on
the alleged vagueness of this particular criminal norm should fail.
6. Conclusion
When domestic courts exercise universal jurisdiction to prosecute piracy jure
gentium, much will depend on domestic law: the scope of the jurisdiction of do-
mestic courts, for example, and the question of intertemporal law. But there
are some matters of international law on which there should be no substantial
disagreement across jurisdictions. In particular, the definition of piracy in
Article 101 of UNCLOS represents customary international law; universal juris-
diction will generally not extend to conduct falling outside of the UNCLOS def-
inition; and defences based on Article 105 of UNCLOS (the alleged seizing
state distinction) should be rejected. Additionally, courts should be sceptical
of defendants' arguments that they lacked adequate notice that conduct falling
within the Article 101 definition was criminally - and universally -
prohibited.
136 Ibid., at 159-162; see also Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 11 (1942) (noting Smith's holding that the
piracy statute adequately defined and punished the crime'because it has adopted by reference
the sufficiently precise definition of international law').
137 Hasan, 747 E Supp. 2d at 639.
138 Ibid.
139 Cf. Ferdinandusse, supra note 4, at 238, 241 (noting that in both national and international
prosecutions for international crimes, 'claims about a lack of knowledge of the applicable
law are relatively scarce and consistently denied' because the norms of prescription are
well-known and the crimes are niallum in se).
140 See e.g. United States v. Shi, 525 E3d 709, 723 (9th Cir. 2008).
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Assuming these aspects of international law are applied consistently and
correctly across domestic jurisdictions, there should be no need for an interna-
tional judicial solution to the modern piracy problem. As Professor Guilfoyle
has previously commented,'[t]he international law on piracy is straightforward
and provides all the legal authority needed to combat pirate attacks off the
coast of Somalia. The real difficulties arise in national legal systems' implemen-
tation of that law and its application in individual cases'.14 1 Over time, domestic
prosecutions of pirates will become simpler affairs as states continue to
update their piracy statutes and judicial precedents are established. The chal-
lenge now is to ensure that the early precedents in each jurisdiction correctly
analyse and apply international law.
141 Guilfoyle,'The Legal Challenges in Fighting Piracy, supra note 37, at 127; see also Bahar, supra
note 79, at 6.
